



COMMON NAVAL BASES FOR EUROPEAN NAVIES

Cdr Edouard JONNET

Student in the 15. Lehrgang Generalstabsdienst/Admiralstabsdienst National (LGAN) in the Führungsakademie of the Bundeswehr (Hamburg)

ABSTRACT

European Union (EU) blue-water navies face three dilemmas: they must simultaneously defend the northern and southern flanks of the continent, control maritime approaches while deploying outside Europe, and control the whole spectrum of naval operations. At present, responses to these dilemmas are reflected in a profusion of operational cooperation in the framework of NATO, the EU or coalitions, with no coordination other than that of national headquarters. Founded in August 2019, the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) is intended to streamline these naval operations in specific sea areas. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was established in December 2017 to find European solutions where national capabilities are insufficient. Three PESCO projects are devoted to logistics, essentially dedicated to land forces. Within these frameworks, European navies must make their voice heard, in order to set up EU Naval Bases (EUNBs) that meet their needs and complement, with this logistical component, the operational logic of the CMP. However, EUNBs are not ends in themselves: their *raison d'être* lies in their capacity to support naval operations. Overall coherence between the CMP and PESCO projects would then be an essential tool for European sovereignty.

CONTENT

Introduction: the three dilemmas of EU Navies	2
The CMP: a way to make things clearer?	4
PESCO's logistic projects	7
A necessary coherence between PESCO and the CMP	9
Conclusion: Learning to "Think European"	11

INTRODUCTION: THE THREE DILEMMAS OF EU NAVIES

EU's blue-water navies of different ranks...

European navies are diverse: their sizes, means and ambitions vary considerably. Among them, navies with oceanic resources have global or regional vocations. Local navies, by definition, do not have offshore capabilities and are not mentioned in this note. In Hervé Coutau-Bégarie's classification,¹ European Union's (EU) oceanic navies are divided into three tiers, from second to fourth, the first rank being occupied solely by the US Navy:

- *Since Brexit, only one second-tier navy with a global vocation (France)*

Unlike the US Navy, the French Navy cannot provide permanent resources in every sea in the world. Nevertheless, it has all the capabilities of a first-rate navy, including an aircraft carrier, nuclear submarines and naval cruise missiles.

- *Three third-tier navies, with regional vocations (Germany, Italy, Spain)*

These navies have a relatively wide range of equipment: amphibious vessels and aircraft carriers for Italy and Spain, diesel submarines, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine destroyers. They are capable of deploying outside their usual regions.

- *Four fourth-tier navies (Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, Denmark)²*

Fourth-tier navies are described as "sub-regional navies with real ocean capabilities," which means that they are capable, on an ad hoc basis, of deploying far from their home ports, but with limited resources.

Thus, seven navies have real ocean capabilities within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). They can deploy close to the EU, but are also able to send ships to distant theatres of operations such as the West Indies, the Gulf of Guinea or the Indo-Pacific area.

... but facing similar dilemmas

Despite their different vocations and ranks, EU navies face similar and specific dilemmas, which are not necessarily those of other Western navies, first and foremost the US Navy, which has far greater resources at its disposal:

- *A first dilemma between Europe's northern flank (with two Baltic and Atlantic/Arctic areas of operations) and its southern flank (with the two Pontic and Mediterranean areas of operations).*

This dilemma is particularly acute for the French Navy, the only EU navy with three coasts: Atlantic, Mediterranean and Channel/North Sea. The French Navy must, for

1. J. Henrotin, *Les fondements de la stratégie navale au XXI^e siècle*, Paris, Economica, 2011, p. 123.

2. Though a member of the EU and the European Intervention Initiative (EII), Denmark is not taking part into the Common Security and Defence Policy and therefore cannot, inter alia, participate in PESCO projects.

example, ensure the protection of the Bay of Biscay bastion³ against Russian incursions and simultaneously deploy ships in the central and eastern Mediterranean.

The Deutsche Marine must also deploy ships in the Mediterranean, while prioritising its historic missions in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic.⁴

- *A second dilemma between the control of approaches (whether to the north or south of Europe) and the need for distant projections, particularly in the Indo-Pacific area.*

For the French Navy, which has a global vocation, this dilemma is particularly glaring: the defence of the world's second Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) requires a permanent presence, far from metropolitan France. In this context, the Navy is seeking to maintain its deployment model consisting of one or two patrol boats, a logistics ship and one or two surveillance frigates.⁵ At the same time, destroyers are to be deployed, for example, in the Straits of Hormuz or the South China Sea.

Now even regionally oriented navies are facing this problem. The Royal Dutch navy must be able to deploy to the West Indies. It has amphibious ships and a naval Caribbean Command.⁶ Belgium, for its part, regularly deploys its ships to Africa⁷ or the Indian Ocean. Despite those constraints, European control of approaches remain structuring for many European navies, especially within the NATO framework.

- *A third dilemma between the top (high-intensity maritime operations) and the bottom of the spectrum (maritime security, anti-piracy, anti-trafficking, etc.) of naval operations.*

Due to budgetary constraints, the French Navy has long favoured armaments programmes at the top end of the spectrum. It now faces an urgent need to replace its patrol vessels, particularly overseas, where six new units are to be deployed by 2022.⁸

For its part, the Deutsche Marine has chosen, for political reasons, to acquire destroyers dedicated to the lower end of the spectrum. The invasion of Crimea in 2014 was a severe warning. From now on, Germany wishes to have new ships capable of high-intensity combat.

Finally, several fourth-tier navies tend to specialise in certain types of equipment (Belgium with its mine warfare) or geographically (Greece in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean).

EU navies therefore face common and specific challenges. How are European navies organised to resolve these dilemmas? How could they better coordinate to optimise the use of their limited resources?

3. French Senate, "[Comptes rendus de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées, Projet de loi de finances pour 2020 – Audition du général Lecointre, chef d'état-major des armées,](#)" 15th October 2019.

4. A. Krause, "Ansprach 60. Historisch Taktische Tagung," [Ansprach 60. Historisch Taktische Tagung](#), 9th January 2020.

5. French National Assembly, National defence and armed forces commission, "[Audition de l'amiral Christophe Prazuck, chef d'état-major de la Marine,](#)" 3rd July 2019.

6. [Commandement der Zeemacht Caribisch Gebied.](#)

7. Belgian ministry of Defence, "[Le Godetia comme plateforme humanitaire,](#)" 13th November 2019.

8. French Senate, "[Comptes rendus de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées, Projet de loi de finances pour 2020 – Audition de Mme Florence Parly, ministre des armées,](#)" 15th October 2019.

The profusion of operational cooperation does not facilitate the use of destroyers' rationalisation, whose ships are the essential backbone of any navy. The Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP), which is still in the making, should allow to combine European efforts more effectively.

Furthermore, the profusion of PESCO projects devoted to logistics does not make it possible to develop a clear strategy for supporting air and sea operations, centred on naval bases. In line with the needs defined by the CMP, a "European pearl necklace" is nevertheless feasible if navies coordinate their efforts to influence the expectations of PESCO projects.

THE CMP: A WAY TO MAKE THINGS CLEARER?

EU navies have relatively few destroyers. Yet they are deployed on a multitude of missions without overall coordination. The CMP can be an essential tool for optimising these deployments.

Limited means

Talking about the European navies' lack of resources – particularly destroyers – is a euphemism. However, even if their capabilities and age differ greatly, destroyers are an interesting indicator, as they form the backbone of today's navies. During his last hearing in the Senate, the French Chief of Naval Operations (Chef d'Etat-major de la Marine – CEMM) referred to the problem: "Ideally we should have one destroyer in the Straits of Hormuz, another in the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb, another in front of Syria, another near Libya in the eastern Mediterranean, another in the North Atlantic, while providing escort to the *Charles de Gaulle* and surveillance of the maritime approaches off Brest and Toulon... For several years now, we have had to choose our priorities."⁹

The CEMM evokes the dilemmas aforementioned: between northern and southern Europe; distant approaches and theatres; bottom and top of the spectrum missions.

As of January 2020, EU's blue water navies' destroyers¹⁰ are distributed as follows.

9. French Senate, "[Comptes rendus de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées, Projet de loi de finances pour 2020 - Audition de l'amiral Prazuck, chef d'état-major de la Marine](#)," 15th October 2019.

10. The generic term "destroyer" here includes destroyers and frigates.

Table No.1

EU's blue water navies' destroyers

Country	Destroyers	Including Dutch design	Including German design	Including French design	Including Italian design	Including Franco-Italian design	Including Spanish design
France	15 ¹			13		2	
Germany	10 ²		10				
Italy	13 ³				11	2	
Spain	11 ⁴						5
Netherlands	6 ⁵	6					
Greece	13 ⁶	9	4				
Belgium	2 ⁷	2					
Total	70	17	14	13	11	4	5
Denmark ⁸	7 ⁹						

1. French Navy, "[Liste des bâtiments de combat](#)," 14th February 2019.
2. German Navy, "[Einsatzflotille 2](#)," 14th January 2020.
3. Italian Ministry of Defence, "[Frigates](#)," 14th January 2020.
4. Spanish Navy, "[Fregatas](#)," 14th January 2020.
5. Dutch Ministry of Defence, "[Schepen](#)," 14th January 2020.
6. Greek Navy, "[Frigates](#)," 14th January 2020.
7. Belgian Ministry of Defence, "[F930 Léopold 1er](#)," 14th January 2020.
8. Denmark, not a member of the CSDP but a member of the EU, cannot participate in PESCO or defense projects within the EU. Its frigates are therefore only mentioned for information.
9. Royal Danish Navy, "[The royal danish navy](#)," 15th January 2020.

A profusion of cooperation

These destroyers are not rationally used: they are employed in a multitude of operational cooperation, with virtually no coordination other than that exercised by each national staff.

NATO is immobilising significant naval assets, in particular to conduct exercises.¹¹ While those exercises maintain expertise, could these ships participate in other operations, as is already the case in the Aegean Sea?

However, EU missions, which are oriented towards the lower end of the spectrum, have become an increasingly important part of destroyers' activity programs. Though, as of February 2020, no surface ships are participating in the EUNAVFOR Med operation, which is being redefined to enforce the weapons embargo against Libya decided in Berlin on 19th January 2020.

11. For example, in 2019, with three different destroyers, EU's blue water navies spent eight and a half months of operational readiness only for the SNMG1: ESPS Almirante Juan de Borbon from 27 March to 7 July, the BS Leopold I from 2 August to 3 November, the HNLMS Van Speijk from 29 August to 12 November, SNMG01, 15 January, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/snmg01/>. During this period, SNMG1 took part in several exercises: Cutlass Fury off Canada in September 2019, <https://tridentnewspaper.com/cutlass-fury-19-halifax/>, and Dynamic mariner in October 2019, https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=111238, each exercise lasting about ten days.

In the Indian Ocean, only one frigate is deployed within Atalanta.¹² In this case, the balance between the low end of the spectrum (EU) and the high end of the spectrum (NATO) seems to tip in favour of the latter.

The multinational coalition is the third deployment model. Operation *Agénor*, which began in late January 2020 in the Straits of Hormuz with the frigate *Courbet*,¹³ is the latest example. It responds to a political, European need to display a position different from that of the United States. Other coalitions, such as Operation *Inherent Resolve* (*Chammal* for France) or Task Force 150 also call on European destroyers. In summary, in addition to national operations and ad hoc coalitions, the EU's navies frigates are divided into six different deployments,¹⁴ with no overall coordination.

An optimization ensured by the CMP?

Instead of having to “choose our priorities,” European navies could better coordinate in order to carry out, with 70 frigates, the missions which seem useful to all.

The Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) project seeks to respond to this need for optimization, especially based on the experience acquired in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Horn of Africa. Approved on 29th August 2019,¹⁵ the CMP is part of the maritime security strategy, which plans actions in regions close (Mediterranean, Black Sea) or distant from Europe (Gulf of Guinea, Gulf of Aden or even the Pacific Ocean). This strategy is therefore also confronted with the near/far dilemma.

Still in the experimental stage, a first Maritime Area of Interests (MAI) in the Gulf of Guinea is to serve as a test bench. Thanks to an almost permanent naval presence, these MAIs must strengthen the EU's political and operational influence, improve the maritime situation's awareness and serve as a facilitator between local actors.

Although the modalities for defining these MAIs remain to be specified, they could naturally correspond to the regions defined by the EU's maritime strategy.

12. O. H. Perry class frigate *Victoria*, Spanish Navy, EUNAVFOR website, “[deployed units - surface vessels](#),” 17th January 2020.

13. French Ministry of Defence, “[Florence Parly passe le nouvel an 2020 en compagnie des 180 marins de la frégate Courbet](#),” 3rd January 2020.

14. Two SNMGs, two NATO missions, one EU mission and Operation *Agénor*.

15. Blog Bruxelles2, “les ministres de la défense ouvrent la porte à un mécanisme de présence maritime coordonnée,” 29th August 2019, <https://club.bruxelles2.eu/2019/08/les-ministres-de-la-defense-ouvrent-la-porte-a-un-mecanisme-de-presence-maritime-coordonnee/> [accessed 18th January 2020].

PESCO'S LOGISTIC PROJECTS

Planned by the Lisbon Treaty, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was formally established in December 2017.¹⁶ Since then, PESCO's 25 member states¹⁷ have proposed projects in many fields. In practice, these projects are led by officers assigned to their national staffs. Three PESCO projects are devoted to logistics, in a joint framework where the land component dominates. With a fleet of destroyers built in Europe, EU blue water navies could coordinate themselves so that their needs are better taken into account in PESCO projects.

An undergoing homogenization for European destroyers?

All blue water navies in the EU are members of NATO, which ensure their interoperability. In addition, all of these frigates were built¹⁸ by European shipyards. The main technical skills are therefore present within the EU, and personnel can be sent to a naval base in the event of a damage onboard a ship.

In addition, the European industrial landscape, traditionally fragmented and competitive, tends to regroup slowly: extra-European competition is a growing constraint which will force the industrialists of the continent – dependent on exports – to regroup to remain competitive. This environment is a factor tending, eventually, to facilitate logistical cooperation between Europeans.

The European Intervention Initiative (EII)¹⁹ is another factor in favour of the integration of European blue water navies. Those navies are all members, with the exception of the Marina Militare and the Hellenic Navy. The transalpine exception should not last, as Italy announced in September 2019 its intention to join the EII.²⁰ Concerning Greece, the participation of a frigate in the carrier strike group²¹ and the plan to purchase two French frigates²² demonstrate a real desire for interoperability.

16. PESCO's official website, "about PESCO," 19th February 2020, <https://pesco.europa.eu/>.

17. The 27 EU member states except Denmark, which is not part of the CSDP, and Malta, which declined the offer to participate.

18. Besides, except for the Spanish Santa Maria class (O. H. Perry) frigates built under American license, all those ships were designed in an EU member state.

19. General Directorate for International Relations and Strategy, "[l'initiative européenne d'intervention](#)," 26th February 2019.

20. Opex360 website, "[L'Italie a l'intention de rejoindre l'initiative européenne d'intervention lancée par la France](#)," 20th September 2019.

21. French Ministry of Defence, "Dossier de presse mission Foch, déploiement de la TF473, Janvier 2020 – avril 2020," 22nd January 2020.

22. Naval Group, "[Naval Group lance la construction de la première frégate numérique de la marine nationale](#)," 24th October 2019.

Naval logistics in three PESCO projects

Three PESCO projects are devoted to operational logistics: LogHub, Military Mobility (MM) and Co-basing. Coordinated by Germany, the Network of logistic Hubs in Europe and support to Operations,²³ abbreviated LogHub, aims to develop a logistics network in Europe. A naval component is planned, notably in Cyprus, where ammunition could be pre-positioned. The rapid tilting from the bottom to the top of the spectrum is sought here.

The nature of the Dutch Military Mobility project is more strategic, even political. Primarily, MM is streamlining cross-border transportation procedures and wants to include them in military exercises. The approach is resolutely joint and focused on European territory, without being theoretically geographically constrained.

The French Co-basing project is not limited to Europe. It plans to share overseas facilities, including naval bases. Thus, a shared use of bases is achievable in the West Indies, especially with the Dutch, but also in Djibouti, in the event of the evacuation of European nationals in the region.

In summary, Co-basing is dedicated to overseas and LogHub to Europe, whereas Military Mobility aims to cover all logistical issues.

EU Naval Bases (EUNB) and the Ithaca network

EU naval bases (EUNB) would meet deployed European ships' logistical needs. These bases could be designed and maintained by the aforementioned PESCO projects, depending on their geographic position: LogHub in Europe and Co-basing outside Europe.

However, PESCO projects are not led by naval officers, but by army officers. Though naval officers are consulted regularly, the naval part of each project is not an end in itself, and is ultimately only a complement to the land component.

However, this need for naval coordination makes sense: a ship deploying to a "Co-basing" area may be required to refuel en route in a "LogHub" base. The necessary fluidity of logistics flows, imposed by the maritime environment, does not match a land logic. However, like the CMP, which coordinates ships' deployments, a steering body called the "Ithaca network," could coordinate naval bases.

To be heard, the voice of sailors must be unified before PESCO meetings. Each of the six major naval staffs should appoint a single referent responsible for following the naval aspects of these three PESCO projects.²⁴

The seven Member States concerned belong to the MM and LogHub projects, and five of them belong to the Co-basing²⁵ project, which guarantees the fluidity of exchanges.

23. EU Council, "[Permanent structured cooperation \(PESCO\)'s projects - Overview](#)," 12th November 2019.

24. The highly integrated Belgian and Dutch navies have a common headquarters.

25. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain are co-basing members. Greece and Italy are absent. However, the need for naval coordination within LogHub and MM could encourage them to join Co-basing.

Given the nature of Military Mobility, the Netherlands could provide the secretariat for the coordination structure.

In summary, the Ithaca network's objectives would be as follows:

- Develop common requests for the EUNBs (bases' opening or sharing, making materials and staff available, drafting specific procedures, etc.) to be issued within of each PESCO project.
- Ensure the consistency of the naval aspects of the different projects.²⁶
- Inform each national staff of PESCO projects' potential capabilities, which can support EU, NATO or ad hoc coalitions' missions.
- Advise the European External Action Service (EEAS) on the CMP's logistical aspects.

A NECESSARY COHERENCE BETWEEN PESCO AND THE CMP

Possible gains for all EU navies

EU navies do not have the resources to carry out all their missions, and must therefore find innovative solutions.

Thanks to the Ithaca network, these navies could benefit from the infrastructure of other Member States to deploy far from their home ports. This is already the case in Abu Dhabi where, as part of Operation *Agénor*, the Dutch and Danish navies are greeted in the French naval base. In Djibouti, Italy and France are present, as well as Germany and Spain intermittently. The Ithaca network would pool resources and optimize costs. In the West Indies, France and the Netherlands coordinate within the EII. Here again, common naval bases would be a source of rationalization.

In Europe, funding for military infrastructure is expensive, and it is often used to accommodate ships from other EU navies. States could benefit from European funding to maintain their naval bases.

Finally, the opening of new naval bases is not envisaged by any EU state. However, new areas may require regular deployments, the costs of which may be limited by a permanent support station.

A necessary decorrelation between naval operations and bases

The EU cannot be credible without regular deployments of European ships supported by a network of naval bases. However, unlike land or air operations, maritime operations can be deployed with a chain of command different from the naval bases that support them.

26. For example, the LogHub Cypriot naval base project is not coordinated with the Djibouti naval base, which is involved in Co-basing. However, a ship deployed in the Indian Ocean can stop in Cyprus on its way there and back.

Operation *Agénor* in the Straits of Hormuz, a multinational and European company, is supported by the French naval base in Abu Dhabi, which remains under national command. NATO-controlled destroyers regularly call at Rota, a Spanish base largely funded by the United States.

For operations which are not under an EU chain of command, EUNBs could therefore improve ships' endurance at sea, in Europe and worldwide. For example, a EUNB in Cyprus - which participates in the LogHub - would be an interesting point of support for the European naval presence in the often-disputed waters of the eastern Mediterranean.

The CMP as a frame for EUNBs

The coherence between the CMP and EUNBs could be managed by the European External Action Service (EEAS).

Each Member State should inform the CMP as soon as one of its ships enters an area for a given mission. In parallel, the Ithaca network would coordinate naval bases in the same area, in order to ensure the support of European ships. This support cannot be optimized without knowing every ship's movement, coordinated by the CMP. In Europe, EUNBs can be co-located with US Navy naval stations such as Rota. Outside Europe, co-location is not desirable if the EU wishes to develop an autonomous policy. Thus, Bahrain or Singapore are not support locations to seek in priority. On the other hand, Abu Dhabi - where France is already established - and the Malaysian naval bases of Sarawak are interesting options.

The Ithaca network at the heart of the naval support ecosystem

The CMP must therefore rely on the Ithaca network to make the link with PESCO projects and develop overall naval logistics. Ultimately, the Ithaca network is a working group bringing together navies from seven EU member states with blue-water capabilities. The network could meet twice a year, and formally express its needs to PESCO projects, through a permanent secretariat.

"Ithaca" officers are ideally officers serving in each national staff's logistics divisions (N4), as well as the Dutch Logistics Task Force's naval officers, in charge of Military Mobility. Thus, coordination between national logistics needs and the recommendations of the Ithaca network would be guaranteed. The diagram in the appendix summarizes the relations between the naval support ecosystem (Ithaca network and EUNB) and the EU institutions and Member States.

CONCLUSION: LEARNING TO “THINK EUROPEAN”

Even if the Military Mobility budget is limited to 2.5 billion between 2021 and 2027 – or less – it must partly benefit European navies.²⁷ Joined within the Ithaca network, European blue-water navies must therefore seize PESCO’s logistics projects and develop Naval Bases of the EU. To give their full operational measure, the association between EUNBs and the CMP is essential.

Beyond the Ithaca network, PESCO projects or the CMP, this type of cooperation’s challenge is much deeper. In fact, it is above all a question of “thinking European.”²⁸ And to think European is first of all to be able to stand out from the Americans and also, to a lesser extent, the British. However, for European navies which are highly integrated into NATO, this approach is far less than natural.

European destroyers’ participation in the *Charles de Gaulle* escort is an encouraging first step. France, which is now the only country with a second-tier navy within the EU, could widen its strategic thinking towards exclusively European cooperation without the carrier strike group.

More generally, “westlessness,” the withdrawal of the West from international affairs, is a subject of debate in Europe. The Ithaca network may be part of the answer to this concern.

The author wishes to thank Mr. Pierre Haroche for his support and sound advice.

27. Bruxelles2 website, “Budget 2021-2027 – MFF – La défense, la sécurité et la politique extérieure fragilisées, le rabot finlandais décrypté,” 17th January 2020.

28. French Ministry of Defence, “L’EMA, une machine de guerre au service du CEMA,” 26th September 2018.


Appendix No.1

Actions plan

Themes	Pilots	Actions
Organisation	EEAS	Define the steering body of the CMP, under the authority of the EEAS.
Organisation	EEAS	Establish a permanent secretariat for the Ithaca network, responsible for coordinating the navies' logistical needs and EUNBs.
Organisation	EEAS	Designate within the EEAS a lead coordinator for the CMP and the Ithaca network.
Organisation	CMP	Define and implement coordination mechanisms for European ships in the first Maritime Area of Interests (MAI) "Gulf of Guinea" (Which ship does what? Where? When? How?)
Organisation	CMP	Suggest to the EEAS to create a MAI for each region listed in part B of the action plan of the June 2018 EU Maritime Security Strategy, namely: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mediterranean Sea - Black Sea - Baltic Sea - North Sea - Atlantic Ocean - West Indies - Gulf of Guinea - Northern Indian Ocean (Red Sea - Persian Gulf) - Western Indian Ocean (Horn of Africa) - Eastern Indian Ocean (Malacca Straits, South China Sea) - Arctic Ocean
Operations	CMP	For each MAI, define a minimum level of European maritime presence (number and type of ships deployed for a minimum number of days per year).
Operations	CMP	Propose to national staff optimizations of ship activity programs, in order to ensure European maritime presence (defined by the previous action).
Logistics	Ithaca	For each MAI, propose to the EEAS a reference naval base, responsible for ensuring the role of logistics hub.

Appendix No.2

Ithaca network operating diagram



Commander Edouard Jonnet is an engineer and a submariner. He joined the French Navy in 2004, and served onboard SSBNs and SSNs. He joined the Führungsakademie of the Bundeswehr in 2018, as a French student in exchange in Germany.

Contact : edouard.jonnet@intradef.gouv.fr